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ABSTRACT: Analyses of European governance usually bring the member states into the 
fore placing the citizens in the background. By means of economic analysis, this paper 
brings explanations of EU legitimacy down to the level of individuals. A method will be 
suggested that combines explanations based on individual interests and a sociological 
approach to identity. The paper investigates how work organizations become levers for a 
European outlook that may release legitimizing from its national context. The individual 
level analysis will be carried out for one particular occupational group (engineers) and the 
research questions are elucidated by a small number of interviews with Danish engineers 
concerning their experience of policies and actions with technological knowledge.   
 
  
 
 
Keywords: Legitimacy, Social Capital, Transaction Costs, Social Identity, Multi-Level 
Governance 
 
JEL classification: H70, L50   
 
 
 2
1 Introduction 
 
In some EU countries the costs of patent protection are five times as much as in the US and Japan. 
These costs could be reduced with EU institutions that give inventors the option of obtaining a 
patent legally valid throughout the EU through a single application to the European Patent Office. 
To avoid that technology producing firms and other owners of patents run the risk of legal action 
before national courts in each member country, a centralised community court to rule disputes 
arising from Community Patents could be set up. 1  Would these efficiency increasing 
improvements increase the legitimacy of the EU? In trying to answer this question, I note that there 
is no unquestioned view of democratic legitimacy. The three liberal-democratic criteria of 
legitimacy (performance, democracy and identity), which are usually applied to the national states, 
are sometimes applied to the EU (Beetham, Lord 1998). It seems to be a minimum of consensus 
that democratic legitimacy rests on both substantive and procedural values. While procedural values 
concern the degree to which groups of the population exercise influence through voting and 
participation in decision making (input-based legitimization), substantive values are associated with 
the idea that a public service is democratically legitimate if the users are satisfied and believe that 
production is run efficiently (output-based legitimization) (Jacobsson 1997), (Erlingsson 1999).  
 
The previous vice president of the EU Commission Leon Brittan (1998) defends shifts of 
sovereignty to the supra-national level by arguing that the populations are willing to accept 
reductions in legislative sovereignty as it gives welfare returns. Brittan also points to the need of 
bringing the analyses of EU legitimacy down to the level of individuals. This is in accord with 
scholarly observations that analyses of European governance usually bring the member states into 
the fore placing the citizens in the background (Svetlozar 2004). It is interesting to look into 
questions of how European citizens become aware of and make a supra-national political system in 
Europe legitimate, which leads to the aim of this paper: to apply economic analysis to bring analysis 
of EU legitimacy down to the level of individuals. A method will be suggested that combines 
explanations based on individual interests and a sociological approach to identity. It will be linked 
up with works by Akerlof and Kranton (2000), (2002), Coleman (1990) and Burt (1992).   
 
                                                 
1 “Activities of the European Union – Summaries of Legislation: Intellectual Property” and “EU Institutions press 
releases: Results of the Competitiveness Council of Ministers, March 2003”. 
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The power of EU is often justified on utilitarian grounds: supra-national institutions are required to 
satisfy crucial needs and values in a cost-efficient way. This paper tries to widen the perspective to 
encompass how properties of community or identity motivate preferences for EU policies. It also 
considers the importance of low identification in the EU and recognizes that the indirect model of 
legitimization points to two types of incorporation to deal with this difficulty (Beetham, Lord 
1998): incorporation of national governments (make use of the legitimating force of national 
identities) and involvement of organized non-governmental actors that are most affected by EU 
policies. The second type of incorporation has been discussed in previous papers arguing that 
empowering regional authorities in EU policymaking gives the citizens preferences for European 
institutions (Gunnarsson 2003), (Gunnarsson 2004). Regional-level politics is closer to the citizens 
and affirms one’s regional identity, which is a legitimizing force of the EU. The indirect model is 
inspiring because it draws attention to the role of non-governmental actors. Yet, it is bounded to low 
EU identity and seems to become awkward when the consequences of EU policies for one 
community depend on actions taken by citizens outside the community. This paper suggests 
improvements.  
 
The identity of an individual for the most part develops gradually within nations with national 
perspectives. EU legitimization, on the other hand, requires that the electors can relate their identity 
to European institutions. The Commission mentions as a hindrance to legitimacy that people cannot 
see that improvements come from European rather than from national decisions (2001 White 
Paper). EU directives and laws lead to much national lawmaking, but it is not obvious how 
domestic politics derive from the EU. Slurring the merits of the EU can even be a strategy national 
politician use to hold up domestic politics. With its focus on work organization, which goes beyond 
national contexts, this paper looks into alternative levers for a European outlook. Many civil 
servants and employees in firms work in organizations that are Europeanized. The staff becomes 
involved in EU decision-making, its dependence on EU´s internal market increases or it is 
otherwise affected by EU policies. Thus, places of work create clashes between identities, and 
differences may transform the national identity. Economic analysis offers an individual level 
analysis of European integration as well as significant insights into how interaction between politics 
and markets affects integration. The individual level analysis concentrates on one particular 
occupational group (engineers) and in this paper the research questions are illuminated by a small 
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number of interviews with Danish engineers, where the making of EU legitimate is seen in view of  
action with technological knowledge.  
 
Section 2 is devoted to a discussion of models of legitimacy. Since the economic model has been 
criticized for being “undersocialized”, it is extended in the spirit of Scharpf (1999) and Schmitter 
(2001). The method for analysing occupational groups draws on the notion of social structure of 
markets. Market structures thus provide a bridge between politicians and their constituencies and 
introduce social norms and institutions to the economic analysis (section 3). The explanations 
offered are flavoured with a case-study based on interviews with and a questionnaire addressed to a 
small sample of Danish engineers. The process of moving between theory and interviews (or 
questionnaire), which is discussed in section 4, ends with a weak form of theories or preliminary 
hypotheses to be explored in a future, more exhaustive study. The research questions are addressed 
in view of a few political practices in the area of EU diffusion policy, which also are fenced off in 
this section. A framework for analyzing legitimacy in terms of social affiliation is suggested and 
fitness for studies of occupational groups in the EU is examined in a few illustrative examples 
(section 5). Section 6, finally, contains a few concluding remarks. 
 
2 Perspectives on legitimacy 
 
Economic analysis and legitimacy 
 
Economic analysis emphasizes the ability of government to satisfy individual needs in a cost-
efficient way. It authorizes political organizations with low production and transaction costs, where 
losers from European integration are compensated by side-payments. Values of various aspects of 
community are neglected. That is, enough attention is not given to traditional liberal democratic 
institutions, how governments democratically select office holders, how consultations are carried 
out and to electoral approval of political programmes.  An efficient EU is legitimate even if it is not 
democratic. This is not to say that an economic approach has no bearing on EU governance. EU 
with underdeveloped democratic institutions rests on efficient service production. Yet, European 
citizens may be reluctant as the European administration is weak as compared with the national 
administrations with limited capacity to influence national-level processes (Svetlozar 2004) 
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 Transaction Cost Economics has overshadowed economic theorizing about institutions and merits 
due consideration in this paper. Advocates of this approach often lean on  functionalist 
explanations, where transaction costs of developing European institutions are considered as small, 
and national traditions and institutions are believed to adapt smoothly. These explanations require 
that bargaining to an efficient agreement does not depend on the bargaining power of the different 
parties and the benefits individual parties receive, and costs and risks they bear, can be evaluated as 
being equivalent to some cash transfer that all costs and benefits can be reduced to.2 In European 
politics, however, powerful states defect from European legislation, which leads to considerable 
bargaining costs. Furthermore, the electors have preferences for national democratic institutions and 
they also have territorial identities, which cannot easily be reduced to a cash transfer. In these cases, 
side-payments cannot compensate citizens for loosing national democratic institutions implying that 
they will not accept that sovereignty moves to the EU. 
 
Economic reasoning does not justify that institutions for civic participation are used to increase EU 
legitimacy. It would increase transaction costs considerably. For example, in economic literature on 
corporate governance it is argued that costs of collective bargaining increase with democratic 
representation and participation, which may remove the social gains of a governance system (Tirole 
2001), (Hansmann 1996). Hansmann, however, accepts democratic procedures in case of 
homogenous preferences and interests, which tend to reduce the transaction costs. Yet, aspects of 
community have no value per se. They do not give grounds for a democratic representation. Cost-
efficiency is served if European institutions are insulated from political pressure, which is brought 
about through the realization of a single market in Europe. It helps the growth of an efficiency-
oriented policy provided by experts and regulatory institutions, such as the European Commission, 
isolated from political pressure (Jachtenfuchs 2001). The European Commission has an important 
role to monitor member state compliance and the huge amount of EU committees is designed by the 
principal (the member states) to supervise the supranational agent (the Commission) (Pollack 2004).   
 
Transaction costs tend to be high when the political credibility is low, for example if the electors 
believe that the expertise is less than enough. A political agent lacking the adequate expertise may 
increase his or her credibility by delegation of tasks to individuals and organizations that are not 
                                                 
2 Cf. the Coase theorem discussed in Coase (1993) and in Milgrom & Roberts (1992). 
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directly accountable to the voters or their elected representatives (Majone 1996). This argument, 
however, neglects that experts and private consultants are powerful and have their own private 
interests to serve. Cowles (1995) examines the involvement of the “European Round Table of 
Industrialists” in the Single Market policy-making process. She develops a model that recognizes 
the power of non-governmental actors at both the domestic and the European levels. Thus, instead 
of becoming a lever of increased legitimacy, regulatory institutions that give expert advice (in 
business, law etc), may create serious capture problems.  
 
In this paper it is argued that economists analysing EU legitimacy should look more into questions 
of how legitimacy depends on identity with communities persons belong to. From this perspective 
there is no guarantee that increased reliance on expertise will increase the authority of the EU. On 
the contrary, the Europeans seem to be sceptical about the credibility of European elites and this 
scepticism seems to be grounded on lack of identification. The paper applies a broad perspective on 
transaction costs that links motivation for behaviour to properties of community (organizations and 
institutions).  It includes ‘motivation costs’, which is associated with situations in which citizens do 
not have all relevant information they need to approve of transferring sovereignty to the EU 
(information incompleteness and asymmetries) (cf. Milgrom, Roberts 1992). In other words, 
legitimization of EU governance depends on issues on disclosure and transparency. Another source 
of ‘motivation costs’ is the inability of politicians to bind themselves to follow a mandate given to 
them by a constituency (imperfect commitment). It will be argued that significant insights into 
deficits of legitimacy in this case are provided by inquiries into social identities locally and social 
structures of the society at large.   
  
Complementary perspectives on legitimacy 
 
 I agree with Granovetter (1992 p 72), who argues that transaction cost economics rely on an 
“undersocialized conception”. This brings me to political models of legitimacy, where aspects of 
community have a value.  Schmitter (2001) defines legitimacy as “a shared expectation among 
actors in an arrangement of asymmetric power such that the actions of those who rule are accepted 
voluntarily by those who are ruled because the latter are convinced that the actions of the former 
conform to pre-established norms”. In assuming that behaviour is governed by a set of norms shared 
by “those who rule” and “those who are ruled”, Schmitter argues that there are common institutions 
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affecting all parties to comply with generally accepted rules. Legitimacy does not only derive from 
efficiency due to low production and transaction costs, but also from common norms for what is 
institutionally appropriate behaviour. Yet, European integration is pluralistic and “will protect the 
diversity of experiences rather than attempt to assimilate them into a single ‘European’ culture or 
identity”. But the actors at the national and sub-national levels are “reasonable pluralistic” in terms 
of “pre-disposed to bargain, negotiate and deliberate until an agreement is found”. This suggests 
that legitimate European institutions develop within smaller islands with favourable conditions for 
community. Schmitter refers to these islands in terms of “fuzzy” practices of governance, but also 
in terms of deliberate “European Governance Arrangements” (EGA), to which power is delegated 
and has a purpose and rules for reaching decisions. Improvements of the economic approach, 
discussed in the following, also rely on Sharpf (1999), who seems to consider the EU as composed 
of multiple governance practices and multiple collective identities. He calls attention to various 
legitimizing mechanisms referring to procedural values in the sense that they presuppose the 
existence of an "identifiable constituency". There is no reason to assume solidarity among the 
members of a constituency, or to believe that they will pursue the public interest. Legitimacy only 
requires that all individual interests can be interpreted in terms of institutionalized norms that serve 
public interests (ibid p 13).  
 
Schmitter’s and Sharpf’s approaches seem to be consistent with the indirect model of legitimization, 
where EU derives legitimacy from organized non-governmental actors. However, like this model 
they seem to neglect norms that are widely recognized among European constituencies. It is 
referred to common rules for transparency and good arguments that help problem-solving 
processes, where persons in different communities are aligned by “institutional arguing” (Neyer 
2003). Legalization is a necessary instrument to structure this discourse, and legalism dominates 
much of EU politics. Exploring EU legitimacy in terms of social categories corresponds with the 
model of individual rationality used in this paper. This model is inspired by Simon’s notion of 
procedural rationality (Simon 1996) extended to political institutions by March and Olsen (1989). In 
assessing value to communities and behaviour, and in linking these assessments to preferences, the 
citizens rely on simplistic descriptions of reality.  The model of rationality applied also recognizes 
that individuals use social norms to organize and interpret their environments. This is contrary to 
the standard model in economics, where possible actions are established objectively and afterwards 
 8
applied to preferences.  Instead norms and preferences play an active role already in the 
construction of the decision alternatives.  
 
3 Method 
 
The research questions are approached by examinations of Danish engineers. One of the 
interviewees - a civil servant - approves vehicle designs. He applies EU standards and also 
participates, together with colleagues from other member countries, in the working out of European 
technical standards for road safety. Another engineer – a university researcher – gets half of his 
research budget from the EU implying that he is directly involved in fund-raising in Brussels. In 
general an interviewee finds conflicts about patent rights and intellectual property costly and has a 
positive attitude to a Community patent and a Community court to rule disputes over patents. In the 
paper, connections between the interviewees and the EU will be seen through the lens of social 
structures of markets, which are social relations developing between employees and between 
employees and employers. These relations constitute an institutional resource that serves the market 
interests of the engineers. 
 
Many engineers gain from having identity relations with the employers. The interests coincide, for 
instance, with regard to policies on intellectual property (patents and licenses). Some engineers 
administrating standardization policies, however, often face tensions between markets for 
intellectual property and public rules for disclosure of information. They feel growing uneasiness as 
administrative practices have to be adjusted to fit vital economic interests. Here professional 
communities are useful to obstruct the negative consequences. Engineers, involved in university 
research, suffer discomfort because the national governments and the EU try to commercialize 
research.  University research and education have traditionally been autonomous based on the self-
organized force of researchers defining standards and rewarding research within peer-groups. These 
fellowships can also be used to master the pressure from the markets for technology.  
  
Social structures of markets are social capital that increases the economic value of transactions in 
markets (cf. Burt 1992). This value depends on the political context, i.e. social structures and 
communities support market strategies differently depending on political circumstances. From this 
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perspective the engineers ensure flows of critical resources both from markets and from institutional 
environments (Hannan, Freeman 1977), (Hannan, Freeman 1989), (DiMaggio, Powell 1991), 
(Gunnarsson 2001). Furthermore, the legitimacy of political institutions is intertwined with beliefs 
about social structures of markets. Legitimization of political organisations is connected with 
beliefs about whether these structures are sufficient, should replace government or eventually 
should be substituted for government. Economic analysis emphasizes preferences persons have for 
the outcome of organizational processes and neglects preferences for procedures controlling these 
processes. In this paper it is argued that the citizens give some thoughts to the way they exercise 
political influence. In doing so, they appraise this influence as members of a social group. Persons 
‘try to do the right things’ by aligning their preferences with the institutional context (the EU, 
domestic political institutions, institutions for civic activity, work organizations), which means that 
social norms and social identity are considered.  
 
The preferences (individual interests) become endogenous and determined when the appropriate 
behavioural rules are figured out in a given situation (Risse 2004). Relations between social norms 
and individual preferences are discussed by Akerlof and Kranton (2000), (2002), Coleman (1990), 
Burt (1992) and Putnam (1993 and 2000). From these discussions it is tempting to conclude that the 
legitimacy of EU institutions increases if the engineers perceive that the social market structures 
they identify with are involved in EU-policymaking. However, one’s perception of political power 
also depends on one’s self-image as belonging to the community and probably varies with the size 
of the social group. Yet, from Putnam (1993) it is obvious that a person’s perception of political 
power also depends on how rightful political institutions are in the eyes of the citizens. That is, 
perception of political power cannot only be associated with the size of the social group the person 
belongs to. According to Putnam, legitimacy derives from the avoidance of “personalistic, patron-
client networks” (ibid p 99). The legislative and the administrative processes are perceived as 
legitimate, because the citizens feel powerful to influence politics when they have supporting social 
networks or communities.   
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 4 Engineers in the EU  
 
Relevant EU policies 
 
The importance of EU for engineers is obvious from diffusion policies, which Stoneman (2002) 
defines as policies that influence economic growth through transfers of technology. Usually, this 
policy area has been associated with the creation of infrastructures conductive to a rapid spread of 
knowledge about management and technology. The preparation of a Community Patent and a 
centralised community court to rule disputes arising from Community patents may illustrate. All 
member states take part in the Munich Convention on the European Patent, which gives inventors 
the option of obtaining a patent legally valid throughout the EU through a single application to the 
European Patent Office. Institutions for obtaining and protecting patents are also seen as a part of 
the EU single market programme linking up with the treatise of Rome. The treatise contains 
principles for legal activism from which a market for technology in Europe probably will be 
institutionalised through decisions by European courts and the Commission without much political 
attention (cf. Brittan 1998), (cf. Scharpf 1999). Similar processes have been found in other areas. It 
is referred to the creation of a European health market, where EU law gives patients the right to go 
for treatment in other Member States (Sindbjerg Martinsen 2004).  It is arguable that Community 
patents make technology more easily available in Europe and the Commission and the Court may 
argue that the Community principle on free movement of goods should be applied.  One lesson to 
be learned from Sindbjerg Martinsen is that transfer of sovereignty to the supra-national level will 
become motivated by the Community court. It will become the active driver (judicial activism) 
rather than political decision making and traditional democratic institutions of national government. 
One question arising is if this process is legitimate in the eyes of engineers.  
 
EU standardization is another diffusion policy, but it is institutionalised with other drivers than 
judicial activism. It develops through organizations for certification mainly based on activities 
organized voluntarily by national organizations3. These activities are coordinated by European 
expert committees that perform some form of trustworthy quality control. While the causal relations 
                                                 
3 The notion of certification derives from Akerlof and is discussed by Scharpf (1999) 
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between standardization and economic growth are unclear, the output-based legitimacy of the 
policy is uncertain. Standardized products and components become easily incorporated into larger 
systems implying that standardization policies speed up technology diffusion and growth within a 
single European market. On the other hand, standardization prevents designs that differ 
considerably from technical standards to be developed. Thus, these policies may hurt incentives to 
innovate. Legitimization is improved if standardization policies foster a rightful balance between 
public interests in disclosure of information and private interests in protecting technological secrets 
(necessary condition for efficient technology markets). A related difficulty for a credible EU policy 
is to establish an organizational structure for certification and quality control that motivates 
European consumers and producers to accept higher prices for certificated products.   
 
Intellectual capital has become crucial in European companies causing conflicts between engineers 
and shareholders about rights to earnings of new technology (Rajan, Zingales 2000), (Audretsch 
1995). These conflicts are channeled through national corporate governance systems, which are 
becoming Europeanized due to EU policies. To help a common capital market in Europe, the 
national governments have been encouraged by the EU to liberalize and deregulate in order to make 
it easier for foreigners to invest in domestic firms.4 It has also become an urgent task to prevent the 
employees (who personify the human capital) from running with valuable assets. This “integration 
problem”, which should be a concern of diffusion policies, has been noticed recently by Rajan and 
Zingales (op. cit.). EU directives on a modern European company law framework aim at 
establishing protection throughout the EU “for those who are involved in and affected by the affairs 
of the company” 5. A solution to the “integration problem” will not be considered as legitimate 
unless it protects engineers from losing rights to intellectual capital in case of dismissals and job-
hopping. It is not obvious that the EU framework places technical workers on an equal footing with 
the shareholders. Yet, due to the subsidiarity principle and to differences in national laws and codes 
of conduct, there are significant national differences in the treatment of the rights. In Germany, 
where legal rules bring employees in a relatively strong position, there is a clause in EU’s takeover 
directive giving the board of a target firm the right to refuse a takeover bid by reference to other 
stakeholder interests than those of the shareholders6. 
                                                 
4 The political elite in the EU has been more or less successful in pursuing member countries, where England 
distinguishes herself as one of the most active to open up for foreign investors, while, for instance, Germany has been 
passive. The Scandinavian countries are gradually changing their attitudes (Brown and Raines 2000). 
5 High Level Group of Company Law, final report, 2002 page 29  
6 Information picked up from an interview with an expert of international company law  
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 Closely related policy areas concern European Work Councils and university-industry partnerships 
for the commercialisation of research.   
 
Interviews and questionnaires 
 
The following approach to legitimacy has developed by incompatibilities between theory and 
transcripts from interviews. Disagreements between an interview and theory were resolved and a 
revised theory was formulated. This theory was revised in the light of another interview and a new 
theory was discovered, which generalizes from the first two interviews and so on.  The same list of 
questions has been used for the interviews and consists of candid questions concerning the 
respondents’ opinion about intellectual property, technology-sharing with colleagues (within and 
outside the working place) and about attitudes to government. Each interview lasted for about one 
hour. Interviews with three engineers - Allan, Anne and Peter - are discussed in the following. 
While the sample of interviewees is small the results are preliminary: a precursor to a large-scale 
empirical study. It should be mentioned that results emerging from questionnaires that were added 
to the interviews will be discussed separately (the questionnaires were answered by four engineers).   
 
Anne is educated at the Royal Veterinary and Agriculture University and at the Technical 
University. She finished her studies in 2000. Afterwards she has worked as a researcher in a middle-
sized biotech firm producing enzymes and micro organisms.  Peter finished his education at the 
Technical University in 1981. His dissertation is on automobile engineering, which motivated him 
to take a job as civil servant in the road safety and transport agency within the Ministry of 
Transportation. Peter has worked there ever since he left the university and is now the head of his 
department. While Anne and Peter have left the university, Allan is an assistant professor at the 
Technical University specialized in computerized network-communication. He is lecturing and 
researching, but he is also starting up a firm in collaboration with five young researchers from his 
university. They have joined up with two engineers having long work experience (thirty years) in 
various industrial firms.    
 
To have an opinion about European politics is costly (information costs are high). In theory it is 
arguable that workplace-based networks provide an efficient way of organizing learning about 
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politics. The interviewees’ use of work relations to become aware of the EU is interesting 
background information of this study. Instead of using social connections engineers may hire an 
expert or pay for membership in national associations such as the Society of Danish Engineers. 
Sometimes citizenship by proxy is caused by communicative strategies applied by the politicians, 
who only respond to loud voices. Lehman Schlozman, Brady and Verba (1997) have found, firstly, 
that policymakers can expect an outcry when organized interests are threatened. Secondly, as the 
distribution of civic engagement is unequal, certain groups are ignored with impunity. They are 
“…simply not part of the campaign discourse” (p 6). In one questionnaire the interviewees were 
asked to assess a value (from 1 to 5) to various sources for professional advice and advice about 
career.  For the small sample of interviewees, table 1 suggests that work-related sources (work 
organizations and professional journals) are at least as important as mass media.   
 
Table 1: The importance of various sources for professional advice and advice about career  
Source: Work 
organizations 
Professional 
journals  
Mass media 
Marks (1-5): 2-3 3-4 2-3 
 
 
Awareness of politics accelerates in problematic situations, for example in connection with closures 
of workplaces. The interviewees point to work-related topics that tend to develop into political 
issues that are specific for engineers. Peter mentions dissatisfaction with the neglect of public rules 
for disclosure (all information obtained by a ministerial agency is public). He associates this neglect 
of public rules with EU policies on technology secrecies. In practice documents are made available 
to the public if a technical design already is available on the market. EU standardization policy is 
another reason for discomfort out of which a political issue may be made. An approval given to a 
producer in one member country is valid in the whole union, while routines for giving approvals 
vary between countries. This brings the producers in a position to play off transport agencies in 
different EU countries against each other.  Anne and Allan worry about the protection of incomes 
from inventions. Inefficient patent regimes make Anne’s incomes more uncertain and increase the 
costs of communication across firms and universities (more contractual regulation, more use of 
project managers and lawyers). Allan, who is setting up a new firm (spin-off from university 
research), acknowledges that patents are needed to satisfy the financial market. But large firms “do 
whatever they want”. They know that most small and middle-sized firms cannot afford to protect 
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their intellectual property, and they show no respect for patent holders´ rights if doing so serves 
their interests.   
 
Results emerging from this study often refer to the regulation of intellectual property (patents and 
licenses). One question arising is if issues on patents are important when engineers make European 
politics legitimate. Answers to one of the questionnaires suggest that there are more important 
policy areas (importance of patents and licenses for daily work is low according to table 2), but 
“conflicts about patent-rights are frequent and costly” scores a high value in table 2. This suggests 
that intellectual property may be a political issue. In addition, the interviewees assign a crucial role 
to the EU and there is some doubt whether intellectual property contributes to an efficient use of 
technological knowledge. 
 
Table 2: Interviewees’ attitude to policies on patents and licenses 
Patents and 
licenses: 
 
Important for 
the daily 
work 
Lead to 
efficient use 
of 
technological 
knowledge 
 
Conflicts 
about patent-
rights are 
frequent and 
costly  
 
Prevent 
engineers 
from using 
critical 
technical 
knowledge 
 
In favour of 
Community 
court and 
Community 
patent 
 
 
Marks (1-5): 
 
 
2-3 
 
2-3 
 
3-4 
 
3-4 
 
3-4 
 
 
Social structures of markets 
 
A method of legitimization analysis was outlined in section 3. It will now be worked out more in 
detail to cover Coleman’s notion of community (Coleman 1990). Joining a community implies that 
a person satisfies his or her individual interests by voluntarily accept to obey others. It implies 
subordination to authority relations, which Coleman assigns into two principal categories. Firstly, 
relations based on similar interests among those involved, who vest authority to one and another to 
serve individual interests (“conjoint authority relations”). Cohesion derives from norms for what is 
good and what is poor behaviour and from sanctions that back these norms. Secondly, authority 
relations characteristic of employee-employer relations (“disjoint authority relations”). Common 
norms are lacking and the community has no value per se. Rights to control actions have been 
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transferred to a principal and those giving away these rights cannot expect that the authority will be 
exercised in their interests. On the other hand, they will get payments in return. 
 
Anne often takes workmates with experiences of biotechnical research on advice. When making 
experiments, she also draws on colleagues employed by customers or on PhDs and researchers at 
the university. Like many engineers, she established contacts during her university studies and can 
draw on social connections with schoolmates and professors throughout her career. Conjoint 
authority relations are also found at the universities. Yet, there are limitations on the amount of 
information that comes to the researcher through social connections at the work place. Allan goes to 
conferences to meet his colleagues. Probably, the authority relations of university communities 
serve three types of private interests: interests of senior scientists to find recruits for their research, 
interests of potential recruits to receive advice from senior scientists and interests of senior 
researchers to share technology. Peter has a similar story to tell. Approvals are often given for 
technical designs, where a professional engineer is demanded. He or she relies on technical 
information and on professional advice from colleagues employed by the transport agency. Contacts 
with professionals outside the workplace are rare. On the other hand, there are no internal barriers to 
technology-sharing. A seniority principle is applied implying that experienced engineers tutor new-
comers.  
 
These authority relations are linked to markets. When developing knowledge of road safety, Peter 
and his colleagues rely on domestic and foreign firms having competences in producing facilities 
for road transport.  One question arising is if this market connection transforms the identity of the 
personnel (rules for openness may be changed). Anne experiences significant market influence from 
producer-customer relations. If the customers have contacts with rival firms social connections for 
technology sharing across firms can hardly be maintained. For example, Allan is a customer of an 
American firm producing tools he uses for research. Even if technological information is exchanged 
with personnel of this firm, “they will never tell /him / how their products work”. Networks Anne 
created during her studies at the technical university are important, but they are only used for 
general issues on engineering and good advice about interesting jobs. Exchange of information 
about specific technical solutions, which usually involves technical secrecies, is not permissible. In 
theory patents could eliminate some barriers for the development of social contacts. In practice, 
 16
however, the transaction costs would be too high (project managers and lawyers have to be 
involved).   
 
To be considered as social structures of markets these workplace communities must serve the 
market interests of the interviewees. Allan, for instance, draws on the conjoint authority relations 
with colleagues and students at the university when recruiting PhDs to the firm he is starting up. 
Technology produced by Allan and Anne can be more easily marketed if they can develop 
sympathy among colleagues towards behaviour preventing technical secrecies from being 
transferred to rival firms. The same type of authority relation guarantees Allan the acceptance by his 
PhD students that issues on critical strategies of his firm should be excluded from the information 
he communicates to the students. This brings us to hybrids of disjoint authority sanctioned by 
identity with the employer. These hybrids improve the market positions of the interviewees. Anne 
considers patents and technical secrecies the “living” of her employer as well as her living. A 
necessary condition for social structures of markets, however, is that loyalty with the employer is 
backed by sanctions within a close community of employees.  Peter and his colleagues identify with 
their employer’s interest in a growing agency for road safety and transport. A new growth strategy 
relies on market motives, client oriented case work and charging clients fees for licences. The 
substitution of the actual static criterion of administration (short waiting time) for a new growth 
strategy could serve the interests of the personnel and the heads of the agency in increasing the 
earnings and to have more interesting jobs.  
 
5  EU legitimization: illustrative examples   
 
It is claimed that social structures of markets can be incorporated into the indirect model of 
legitimization. To show this it is referred to Coleman (1990), who draws attention to social 
structures that facilitate certain actions of individuals within the structures and considers the 
structures a social capital. From this perspective social relationships are resources to satisfy 
individual interests. Furthermore, social capital is not a single entity, but is defined by its function, 
which depends on whether it is used to create values in markets, in political or other institutional 
contexts. A narrow approach is applied in this paper, which concentrates on values created in 
markets, but it also admits that beliefs about social structures of markets are intertwined with the 
legitimacy of political institutions. Danish engineers are motivated by technological professionalism 
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and adjust their competences to increased competition with other professional groups7. In the 
following, social capital that serves interests of high technological professionalism will be called 
independent capital. Social capital that serves the engineers’ interests of loyalty to the employer 
will be called cooperative capital8. Independent social capital will be associated with social norms 
prescribing that “one ought to share the technological knowledge one possesses with everybody, 
who accept this norm”. Cooperative capital is associated with a norm that prescribes which 
technological knowledge should be kept secret in order to protect the competitive advantages of the 
employer. This norm derives from a belief of the employees that one protects one’s own living by 
protecting the earnings of the employer. 
 
It will be returned to the interviews. More specifically, to explanations showing how EU policies 
are confirmed by persons in work organizations that rely on independent and cooperative capital. 
Before, I have a few remarks about the way EU legitimacy is approved at the individual level. 
Legitimacy is a special right politicians have to exercise power without using force. The legitimacy 
of those who rule the EU cannot easily be related to voting (elections to the EU parliament). It is 
unclear whether a low voter turnout is a signal to the politicians that the citizens are satisfied with 
the way Europe is governed or a signal about lack of legitimacy. If a voter is satisfied, she or he 
may not see any reason for obtaining information and spend time on voting. An alternative way of 
approaching legitimacy is outlined in this paper. Instead of looking at voting behaviour the paper 
emphasizes the importance of social affiliations for legitimization. In appraising interaction at the 
EU level, citizens refer to their perceptions of power as a member of a social group and base their 
appraisal on how the advantages of belonging to a social group depend on European decisions and 
institutions. According to the individual level approach to EU legitimacy, EU institutions must 
become a reference point in action taken by these social groups. It is claimed that this condition is 
partially satisfied by the research design focusing on occupational groups and working 
organizations, which extend beyond national contexts and, thus, help to promote a European 
outlook. Since different occupational groups relate to EU policymaking differently, the range of 
legitimization processes probably becomes wide. This is an empirical question to be looked into in 
future research. 
                                                 
7 Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark, ”Fremtidens ingeniørprofiler – et debatoplæg om ingeniørers kompetencer og 
uddannelser”, oktober 2002 and ”IDAs strategiske samarbejdsrelationer og alliancer”, Ingeniørforeningen i Danmark 
2001 
8 “Identity with the employer” means that employees subordinated in an authority relation are satisfied when the 
interests of the employer are satisfied. 
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 Before returning to the interviews it will also be hinted at needs for improvements of the indirect 
model of legitimization. While this model is useful for low European identification, empirical 
evidence discussed below suggests that some policy areas are characterized by high identification. 
Even for policy areas with low identification the model is difficult to use. If activities of significant 
interest for one community are controlled by persons in other communities the model becomes 
awkward. It is asked for a more general approach to legitimacy, discussed in the following. This 
approach explores legitimization using identity externalities. To illustrate it is referred to two social 
categories: engineers, who think about themselves as ‘employees’ and engineers having 
identification with ‘entrepreneurs’. ‘Employees’ act according to their identity because they believe 
it serves their market interests to have a safe job and unemployment compensation in case of being 
unemployed. They obey loyalty to the employer’s interest in recruiting engineers and in protecting 
patents. ‘Entrepreneur identity’ motivates members to set up their own firms and to create goodwill 
in the eyes of the suppliers of finance. Instead of relying on patents there are prescriptions saying 
that ‘entrepreneurs’ balance the need of keeping technological knowledge secret against sharing 
technology with others. Moreover, a loyal member of this community accepts what Carree and 
Thurik (1999) call “control commitments”. This is a specific advantage of small firms that derives 
from the fact that they are controlled by a small group of persons, or bears the personal stamp of 
one person. This motivates inventors to work below the minimum wage and convince the 
employees to work below market prices. 
 
Linkages between communities, which are lacking in the indirect model of legitimacy, will be 
analyzed in terms of identity externalities, which occur when persons refer to behavioural 
prescriptions of social categories and one person’s action has meaning and evokes responses in 
others (Akerlof and Kranton 2000).  Whenever a person, who usually complies with the prescription 
of one social category, begins to behave according to prescriptions of another category it has a 
psychological effect on other persons that may lead to a response. Also encounters between persons 
with different identity provoke this effect and response. All ‘employees’ will lose social capital if 
persons in the group of employees begin to behave as ‘entrepreneurs’. They will suffer from more 
frequent job-hopping as the behavioural prescription for ‘entrepreneurs’ does not respect the loyalty 
to the employers. ‘Entrepreneurs’ on their side will suffer discomfort to work together with 
‘employees’, to whom control commitments are unacceptable. It is claimed that legitimacy derives 
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from persons’ perception of political power, which depends on their self-image as belonging to a 
social category. Self-image varies with the size of the social group and increased size increases the 
perceived political power. It is a prerequisite for feelings of having power to influence politics that 
the group also is perceived as democratic and fair, where all members are treated equally. Political 
institutions appear as less rightful when members leave the group or choose behavioural 
prescriptions of other social categories. This distrust of politics is not repaired by immigration, 
which instead seems to lead to social encounters and costs leading to further distrust.  
 
The indirect model: EU patents and EU standardization 
 
Anne is loyal to the interests of her employer to protect technological secrecies. This loyalty is a 
cooperative capital backed by sanctions by her workmates, which reduces job-hopping and 
technological spillover to rival firms. One question arising is if this communality is a legitimizing 
force for the judicial activism that characterizes EU patents (cf. section 4). In showing interests in 
building cooperative capital locally, Anne and her colleagues may increase the efficiency of EU 
policies in favour of output-based legitimization. However, in case of a trade-off between 
cooperative and independent social capital this effect may disappear. Anne tells me that even in 
large firms technical workers exchange technological information with rival firms (through 
producer-costumer relations) and with researchers and PhDs at universities. This exchange, which 
usually is motivated by technological professionalism, is subject to costs as patents must be 
arranged before communication can start. This limitation on the free exchange of technological 
information may reduce the independent capital, which is a price for maintaining the loyalty to the 
employer. If the price becomes too high, job-hopping may become more acceptable among the 
engineers.  
 
Scholars have documented how engineers and technical workers in Silicon Valley exchange 
technological knowledge through frequent job-hopping. The explanation to high labour turnover is 
that trade secret protection is weak in California (cf. Fosfuri & Rønde 2004).  One lesson to be 
learned for EU legitimacy is that there is a connection between legitimacy and authority relations 
within the firms (the amount of cooperative capital). Cooperative capital contributes to an efficient 
delivery of policies on Community patents based on legal activism, which tends to make EU 
institutions more legitimate. However, to ensure legitimization EU institutions must become a 
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reference point in the workplace-based networks. Moreover, less judicial activism and more 
political attention probably increase the involvement of technology producers in EU’s legislative 
process and further increase the legitimacy. As concerns standardization policy, future road safety 
will probably be tackled by EU leading to increased competition among national agencies with fees 
on transportation approvals. This can improve the budget situation of the agencies and increase the 
rewarding of the personnel. Accordingly, the interview with Peter suggests identification with the 
employer’s interest in a growing agency. This cooperative capital will make the delivery of EU 
policy in this area efficient increasing the output-based legitimacy of the policy. As mentioned in 
section 4, EU’s standardization policies are based on voluntary activity by national organizations. 
Communities of engineers provide a solid foundation of this activity and when involved in 
policymaking, they will make the conditions for EU legitimacy still more favourable.  
 
It is convenient to think about the indirect model of legitimization as if common European norms 
are replaced by a principal. The principal derives legitimacy from alliances with governments and 
non-governmental actors. It is also tempting to consider the authority relations as “disjoint” in 
Coleman’s sense of the word. However, he considers disjoint relations as voluntary, where 
individuals are free to enter and leave at any point in time. This is not the way one thinks about 
political communities. The approach tends to overrate the attractiveness of new European 
institutions as well as the elasticity of domestic institutions and communities. To avoid coercion, 
persons are compensated for their losses in welfare by side-payments. Yet, it is an interesting 
question if reduced values when one community is substituted for another can be compensated 
through cash transfers. If democratic values associated with domestic institutions cannot easily be 
reduced to a money equivalent (or other obvious measures of welfare returns), a legitimate 
representation with shared responsibilities between a national and a supra-national level of 
governance cannot be easily built.  
 
For example, privatization of technological knowledge through EU patents may have positive 
wealth effects, but can they legitimize transfers of sovereignty to European institutions? To increase 
the cooperative capital to a proper level, it may be necessary to give up some of the independent 
capital. For engineers, reductions of independent capital are reductions in wealth. Unless it can be 
transferred to a cash transfer, it is difficult to make the calculation showing that this reduction is 
balanced by the value of the increased cooperative capital. According to Anne, it is true that 
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learning about new technology organized by the public authorities reduce the private costs of social 
learning. It also sounds reasonable that these reductions in costs compensate the engineers for 
leaving over control to the public authorities. But the social relations for information exchange that 
are lost have a meaning to Anne, which affects the reliance on the knowledge she obtains. In her 
own wording: “when you go to conferences, you learn during the lunch breaks”. Many policies by 
national governments and the EU, which make technological information public (coherent 
‘European Research Area’, technology advisory centres etc.), reduce the transaction costs without 
deriving the necessary legitimacy to become successful. The explanation may be that independent 
capital is destroyed. While these negative wealth effects cannot easily be reduced to a cash-transfer, 
the technical workers are unable to see if the reductions of the transaction costs are worthwhile.   
     
Improving the indirect model  
 
The indirect model of legitimacy becomes awkward when the consequences of EU policies for one 
community depend on actions taken by citizens outside the community. One way to tackle this 
difficulty is to examine identity externalities (examine the meaning actions taken by a person in one 
group has for persons in another group). While political institutions coordinate conflicts between 
communities, questionnaires about the interviewees’ attitude to EU governance probably provide 
insights into crucial identity externalities. Scholars in the field of experimental and behavioural 
economics note that democratic institutions (lawmaking, voting) may bring to mind social norms 
that encourage coordination (Tyran, Feld 2002). Norms for cooperation or for disobedience are 
activated depending on how rightful public authority is perceived. Peter expresses lack of 
confidence in government: “funding technology sharing by taxes encourages people to cheat and 
swindle”.   
 
Social encounters have been examined by a questionnaire that refers to ten different policy areas. In 
a first step, an interviewee was asked to assess a value (from 1 to 5) to each area indicating 
preferences for transferring the area to the EU. For each interviewee, the interviewer, in a second 
step, made a random selection of answers, which were arranged into four pairs. For each pair, the 
interviewee was asked to write down the reason for assessing a higher value to one of the policy 
areas in a pair. Finally, the reasons assigned were interpreted in terms of identity externalities. It is 
arguable that many identity externalities perceived as threatening are tolerated if a person also 
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perceives his or her community as powerful. Accordingly, it is interesting if the answers to the 
questionnaire also can be interpreted in terms of perception of political power. The author’s 
interpretations of the written answers are presented in table 3.   
 
Table 3 suggests that the indirect model based on low European identity is incomplete. The 
questionnaire visualizes areas, where prescriptions for behaviour probably are motivated by a 
European identification (“We”). There are two groups of policy areas that are associated with low 
European identity (“We” and “them”). The first group seems to have a predisposition to the EU for 
“security reasons” (“EU legitimacy: Security reasons” in table 3). More specifically, it covers 
identity externalities concerning the interviewees’ confidence in the protection of working places 
and natural resources (which are believed to be threatened by actions taken abroad). The interviews 
visualize that security also depends on perceptions of power. Thus, the interviewees are not willing 
to accept that liability moves from the national to the EU level unless they have power to influence 
EU. Like in the indirect model of legitimacy EU seems to require the legitimizing force of national 
governments or non-governmental actors.  
 
Table 3: Meaning the interviewees impute to transfers of policy areas to the EU  
 
Perception of 
political power 
EU legitimacy: Security 
reasons 
EU legitimacy: common 
norms for efficiency 
and fairness Natinal government legitimacy: Security reasons 
”We” and 
”them”       ”We” 
Social security a 
national affair 
Social security 
concern 
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 In fact low-identity cases where this force is not required seem to be rare. Persons within local 
communities must be informed about multiple identities. They must also give “outsiders” rights to 
control actions even if these actions affect their own communities. This may be to the point when 
Anne admits that her interests differ from university researchers and engineers, who like Allan try 
to set up their own firms. They are entrepreneurs, who need public forums, where technological 
knowledge can be used freely. Anne acknowledges that actions taken by her to promote efficient 
patent regimes limit the technological matters to be discussed in these forums. Conversely, patents 
cannot easily be obtained for ideas and designs already revealed in a forum. However, if both 
communities recognize each other’s right to control actions with consequences across the 
communities, it is reason to believe that European institutions will be accepted (even if political 
power is moved between the two groups).  Without this recognition (or if the power to influence EU 
is lacking) the need of security should be satisfied by the national government (“National 
government legitimacy: Security reasons” in table 3).   
 
It is argued that the imputation of meaning to clashes between identities depends on national 
politics, which is a serious problem for EU legitimacy. Countervailing forces have been discussed 
in this paper such as the Europeanization of work organizations. Governance structures in Europe, 
which make the borders between European spaces fuzzy, may also be a countervailing force. It is 
referred to EU multi-level governance that produces fluid borders between regions and states. While 
it is far from clear how this type of governance becomes a driver of a European identification, there 
is evidence of a growing number of cross-border regions that may wipe out borderlines between 
people. The questionnaire suggests that there may be prescriptions for behaviour that are 
appropriate to people in many European communities (which is contrary to the indirect model of 
EU legitimacy). Policy areas are visualized, where EU legitimacy derives from a European 
identification with norms for efficiency and fairness (“EU legitimacy: Common norms for 
efficiency and fairness” in table 3). It turns out that this is the most important group of areas 
identified by the interviews. It includes policies for obtaining and protecting patents, public support 
of industrial research and regulation of mergers and acquisitions. These are efficiency-oriented 
policies that can be delivered by experts according to the economic model of legitimacy. The 
questionnaire suggests that some policy areas such as “protection of working places” lack a sharp 
border line to areas that for security reasons has a predisposition for the EU. Accordingly, there are 
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border-line cases, where social encounters and power are crucial for some interviewees, while  
identity with European norms are important for others. In the latter case perception of power is 
irrelevant for EU legitimacy (indicated by the broken line in table 3). Governance is imagined as 
arrangements for “institutional arguing” structured by legalization, common rules for transparency 
and good arguments (cf. Nyer 2003).  
 
It is unanimity between the interviewees that social security should be left to the national 
government (“Social security a national affair” in table 3). One explanation may be the success of 
the Danish welfare state. If the same questionnaire had been answered by engineers in another EU 
country it might well be that the result had been more ambiguous. A more plausible explanation is 
that there are policy areas, which are “irreducible national” (cf. Beetham, Lord 1998).  We may 
imagine them as policies based on experience of care and nursing that are very personal. These 
areas have been located on the “We”-axis in table 3 but to the right of the European identity 
indicating that they reflect identity with local communities based on ties of friendship. Moreover, its 
location is below the axis showing that perception of power plays no role. 
 
6  Conclusion 
 
The aim of this paper is to apply economic analysis to bring analyses of EU legitimacy down to the 
level of individuals. By concentrating the explanation on Danish engineers, there is a risk of 
excluding possibilities for generalizations. On the other hand, the explanation offered uses general 
methods and approaches that link satisfaction of individual interests to social structures, which 
brings us to the indirect model of legitimization. It recognizes that the creation of a European 
identity is seriously limited, for instance, because individual identities usually develop in national 
contexts with nationalistic perspectives. It is an advantage of this paper that it considers work 
organizations, which extend beyond national contexts and may give leverage for a European 
outlook. Alliances are often established between these organizations and the authorities as part of 
problem-solving strategies at various levels of EU governance, for instance, when a single actor 
(foremost a public organization) is unable to manage a problem by itself (Gunnarsson 2003). While 
generalizing the indirect model, the paper demonstrates methods suitable for analyzing the effects 
 25
of these alliances on the legitimacy. All in all, the material presented in the paper provides grounds 
for drawing a few conclusions. 
 
One lesson so far is that Danish engineers seem to become aware of how Europe is governed 
through Europeanized work-relations. This is true irrespectively of work as civil servant, researcher 
or as an engineer in a private company. Peter (civil servant) prepares technical standards for road 
safety in Europe. He realizes that the European Single Market creates conflicts about public rules 
for disclosure of information about technical designs. A single market in Europe also plays off 
transport agencies in different EU countries against one another. Allan (researcher) is in part 
founded by the EU. In addition, new university-industry partnerships imply that he must give EU 
policies on intellectual property and patents some thoughts. The commercialization of the university 
research implies that the work-relations of Allan and Anne (engineer in a private company) become 
alike. For Anne, the Single Market accelerates the Europeanization of the producer-customer 
relations, which simultaneously demands an efficient patent-regime in the EU.   
 
Secondly, the paper tries to tell a reliable story about how engineers, by building social capital 
within work organizations, help the legitimization of the EU. The interview with Anne visualizes 
how cooperative social capital, which derives from loyalties to the employer, satisfies her payment-
interests. If interaction at the EU level becomes a reference point in the building of cooperative 
capital, then the latter becomes intertwined with the legitimization of EU policies on patents. Yet, if 
the price in terms of damages to the independent social capital, which serves the engineers’ interest 
of technological professionalism, is too high, or the damage cannot easily be reduced to a monetary 
equivalent, the effect on EU legitimacy is likely to disappear. This story does not prove that the 
indirect model of EU legitimization is suitable when the consequences of EU policies for one 
occupational group depend on actions taken by other groups. An alternative story points to the 
importance of identity externalities. It mentions policy areas with low EU identity and 
interdependencies across occupational groups, but the legitimating force of national governments 
and non-governmental groups is still efficient. However, the involvement of governments and non-
governmental groups must bring about that the persons in the occupational groups perceive that 
they have power to influence the EU. The alternative story also mentions policy areas with 
interdependencies between occupational groups, but perception of political power is not a necessary 
condition for EU legitimacy. However, this brings us to the special occasion of a European 
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identification with norms for efficiency and fairness. Finally, there seems to be areas that are 
“irreducible national”.   
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